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INTRODUCTION
How many people complain about the cost of medication in the
United States? How much of a strain does payment for the
treatment of a deadly disease put on the average American? Most
people dealing with this situation in America would answer that
ensuring funds are available to continue treatment puts a huge
amount of stress on an individual or a family—so much stress that,
at times, an individual or a family may be forced to file for
bankruptcy. Now imagine this person or family lived in SubSaharan Africa. How much of a strain does this payment cost
them? Unfortunately, most Africans in Sub-Saharan countries
affected with a disease never even get to that point. The strain they
deal with is the strain of wondering daily if they will ever have
access to treatment. High prices, clinics or hospitals located out of
reach, insufficient government infrastructure, and lack of properly
trained medical practitioners are just some of the reasons why
affected individuals in countries like those in Sub-Saharan Africa
have access problems, with high prices being blamed as one of the
main reasons for lack of access.1

1

See Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment
Help?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 107, 107–08 (2008); see also COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL
PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH:
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 202 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf.
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But there are two sides to every story. To understand why high
prices are sought, you must put yourself in the shoes of an
American pharmaceutical company competing with other drug
companies for a profit and having to expend millions of dollars on
testing to gain approval from the Food and Drug Administration
(the “FDA”) before being able to market a drug.2 As a drug
company, you also know that your main profits are derived from
sales of drugs that are still covered by a patent.3 Once a drug goes
off patent, generic companies enter the market and erode your
profit margin.4
The United States affords a high level of protection to
intellectual property holders, including pharmaceutical companies
owning patent rights.5 By giving the patent owners this protection,
pharmaceutical companies are able to obtain the profits necessary
to cover their research initiatives and foster innovation.6 If these
companies were not afforded this high level of protection, there
would be no incentive to expend the millions of dollars it costs to
push a drug through the stages of testing necessary to gain FDA
marketing approval.7 The United States is also active in pursuing
infringers to ensure that the benefits of the statutorily-granted
protection are not eroded.8
Other countries do not offer such generous protection to begin
with or do not offer intellectual property holders the means to
effectively police infringing activity, even if the right is
2

See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 117.
See Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July
15, 2004), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17244.
4
See id.; Dutfield, supra note 1, at 117.
5
See Christopher Lea Lockwood, Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of
Columbia: A Preemptive Strike Against State Price Restrictions on Prescription
Pharmaceuticals, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 143, 148–49 (2009).
6
See id.
7
See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283,
285 (2008); see also Lockwood, supra note 5, at 148 (discussing the patent protection
necessary in light of the four principle stages of research required to enter a drug on the
market: “1) discovery of new compounds, 2) preclinical testing in laboratories . . . , 3)
clinical trials, and 4) FDA review”).
8
See Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries:
U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 569, 569–70, 582 (1994).
3
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recognized.9 This can be a problem for intellectual property
holders in countries like the United States. The incentive for an
American company to enter its goods into a market affording little
intellectual property protection is very low. Incentive to enter or
keep a product in a market is also low where intellectual property
protection, if granted, is not adequately enforced. In markets
where intellectual property rights are not adequately enforced,
patent owners experience profit erosion due to the presence of
infringing products on the market.10
In an effort to solve the problem of varying levels of
intellectual property protection across country borders, members of
the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”)11 adopted the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS” or the “TRIPS Agreement”).12 The purpose of
the TRIPS Agreement is to enable “the protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights” across country borders so as to
promote “technological innovation and . . . the transfer and
dissemination of technology.”13
However, TRIPS presented a problem to the least developed
countries (“LDC”s), such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because
these countries do not have the infrastructure in place to provide
adequate patent protection, nor do they have capabilities to
properly enforce patent rights, if and when they are granted within

9

See Baris Karapinar & Michelangelo Temmerman, Benefiting from Biotechnology:
Pro-Poor Intellectual Property Rights and Public-Private Partnerships, 27 BIOTECH. L.
REP. 189, 198 (2008).
10
See Kirchanski, supra note 8, at 571–72.
11
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). The WTO “is
the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between
nations.” What Is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). The WTO consists of a
group of 153 countries, wherein the countries are referred to as “member” countries. Id.
Some of its functions include: “administering WTO trade agreements, [serving as a]
forum for trade negotiations, handling national trade disputes, monitoring national trade
policies, [providing] technical assistance and training for developing countries, and
cooperati[ng] with other international organizations.” Id.
12
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
13
Id. at art. 7.
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their countries.14 Perhaps a bigger problem and one that is heard
frequently among critics and protesting countries is that the higher
level of protection that member countries must provide to patent
holders under TRIPS has the potential to maintain drug prices at
high levels. As a result, citizens of Sub-Saharan countries suffer
because they do not have the income to pay for the price demanded
for patented protection. Thus, there is inevitable tension between
the need for a company to obtain profits from its patented
invention and a current need to alleviate the public health problems
in LDCs by providing drugs at low or no cost.15 In the area of
pharmaceuticals, this is especially problematic when looking at the
treatments available for HIV/AIDS and other epidemics. For
instance, as of the end of 2008, 67% of the world’s HIV population
resided in Sub-Saharan Africa.16
However, despite TRIPS’ intended proliferation of stronger
intellectual property protection across all member countries, which
allows patent owners to reap greater economic benefits from their
patents, it does not preclude access to life-saving treatment for
poor LDCs unable to obtain patented life-saving treatments at the
typical commercial rates.17 It left open the possibility of
compulsory licenses and parallel importation for use by developing
and least developed countries to obtain needed pharmaceuticals.18
But criticism of the TRIPS Agreement led to the adoption of
the Doha Declaration (“Doha”).19 Doha’s purpose was two-fold:
to stress that TRIPS accounts for the developing and least
developed countries’ public health problems, and to further clarify
the provisions that countries can use to foster transfer of
14

See infra Part II.A.
Bird & Cahoy, supra note 7, at 283.
16
Worldwide AIDS & HIV Statistics, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
17
Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm#
importing (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter WTO Obligations].
18
Id.
19
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see also Hoachen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond:
Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 123,
125 (2004).
15
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intellectual property and essential pharmaceutical products
necessary to treat those afflicted with epidemic diseases such as
HIV/AIDS.20
Unfortunately, despite the language of TRIPS/Doha and
recognition of the public health problem by member countries,21
access to much needed pharmaceuticals is still difficult for poorer
nations to obtain and little has been done by the member countries
through TRIPS to increase access. For example, since a 2003
decision by the TRIPS Council allowing non-producing LDCs to
import pharmaceuticals, only one country has seen its benefits—
Canada has used the system to provide drugs to Rwanda.22
The current state of affairs cannot be maintained if we are to
further public health initiatives related to the LDCs. This Note
analyzes the options currently available through TRIPS for transfer
of pharmaceutical technology to LDCs, how effective these
options are, and what should be done in the long term to help ease
the public health problems worldwide. Part I will provide
background on the TRIPS Agreement and its relevant declaration
and decisions relating to public health. Parts II and III will analyze
the conflict that exists between the uniform intellectual property
rights that TRIPS promotes and the LDCs’ lack of access to lifesaving treatments, despite the public health provisions. Part IV
will argue first that current TRIPS public health measures are not
sufficient to solve the problem of access to essential
pharmaceuticals in the long term because the conflict mentioned
above will always remain. Second, it will argue that mechanisms
like public-private entities should be utilized to solve the problem
instead.

20

See id. ¶¶ 1–5.
The TRIPS Agreement applies to all WTO members. Overview: The TRIPS
Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2
_e.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) [hereinafter WTO Overview].
22
Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Address at the 11th Annual
International Generic Pharmaceutical Alliance Conference in Geneva (Dec. 9, 2008),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl111_e.htm.
21
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I. BACKGROUND
A. TRIPS Agreement
Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Agreement, otherwise known as the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, was
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.23 The TRIPS
Agreement came about in order to foster the free movement of
technology and innovation between member countries by
attempting to circumscribe a uniform set of intellectual property
rights that are protected and enforced across member countries.24
While this was beneficial for protection of intellectual property
rights, especially in developed countries, it was problematic for
LDCs because recognition of intellectual property rights allows the
rights holder to assert its patent and obtain monopoly pricing.25
Within this broad agreement, provisions exist to specifically
address the effect of intellectual property rights on public health.26
Under Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, members are able to
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition,
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of th[e]
Agreement.”27 In other words, it recognizes that public health
problems, among others, may exist and allows members to adopt
special measures to deal with these problems, as long as the
measures are limited to those allowed by the TRIPS Agreement.28
Examples of these measures, to be discussed in further detail
below, include an explicit allowance for compulsory licenses and

23

TRIPS, supra note 12.
Id. at art. 7.
25
See, e.g., Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, The
Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty
Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 150–51 (2008) (discussing the issue of
monopoly pricing for over-protective patents); Barton E. Showalter & Jeffery D. Baxter,
Strategic Use of Software Patents, 547 PLI/Pat 1057, 1074–75 (1999) (discussing
monopoly pricing as an after-effect of software patents).
26
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 8.
27
Id.
28
See id.
24
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an implicit allowance of parallel importation through a failure to
proscribe the activity, as established in the Doha Declaration.29
In reference to patents, such as those on pharmaceutical
products and processes, TRIPS entitles a patent owner to have its
exclusive rights of production, use, sale, and importation protected
when dealing with another member country.30 Members can
provide exceptions to these exclusive rights if they “do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner.”31 These exceptions can take the form of special measures
that are aimed at dealing with public health problems such as the
lack of access to pharmaceuticals.32
The first measure is a compulsory license.33 The traditional
definition of a compulsory license is a government’s granting of a
license without the permission of the rights holder.34 Generally,
before a compulsory license can be granted under the TRIPS
Agreement, the requesting party must first attempt to obtain a
voluntary license from the patent owner on reasonable commercial
terms.35 However, the term “reasonable commercial terms” is not
defined by the TRIPS Agreement. If a voluntary license cannot be
obtained, then a compulsory license can then be issued.36 But, in
“the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use,” a
compulsory license can be issued without first negotiating for a
voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms.37 The purpose

29

See Doha Declaration, supra note 20, ¶¶ 5–6.
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 28.
31
Id. at art. 30.
32
See Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 5.
33
Id.
34
Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Forcing Firms to Share the
Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust (May 10,
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.htm#N_29_.
35
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31(b); see also TRIPS and Public Health: Frequently
Asked Questions, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
TRIPs_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS FAQ].
36
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31.
37
Id. at art. 31(b).
30

C06_MELLINO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 12:56 PM

TRIPS AGREEMENT: HELPING OR HURTING LDCS?

1357

of the exception to the negotiation requirement is to save time,38
although the TRIPS Agreement does not specify what would
qualify as a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency.
Due to lack of resources, LDCs such as those in Africa would
be unable to offer commercially reasonable terms to a patent owner
of pharmaceutical products or processes.
To bypass the
requirement to negotiate for a voluntary license on these terms, the
government of an LDC would have to assert a national emergency
or other circumstance of extreme urgency when requesting a
compulsory license.39 The license would then enable the LDC to
utilize the patented formula or technology. But, even if the
exception is invoked, TRIPS still requires that “the right[s] holder
shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each
case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization.”40 TRIPS does not clarify what would constitute
“adequate remuneration.”41 This will be considered in more detail
later in Part I.C.
The TRIPS Agreement also leaves the notion of parallel
importation on the table.42 It does not explicitly allow for parallel
importation, yet it does not explicitly prohibit it either.43 Under
parallel importation, goods are sold into the parallel market at a
much cheaper price than they could have been sold through the
patent owner.44 While this is beneficial for the party that seeks to
38

TRIPS FAQ, supra note 35.
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31(b).
40
Id. at art. 31(h).
41
JAMES LOVE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NONVOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2005), http://www.who.int/
medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf.
42
Parallel importation occurs when goods are produced by the patent owner or with
the patent owner’s permission, through a license, and then subsequently imported into
another country without permission of the patent owner. International Exhaustion and
Parallel Importation, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_
business/export/international_exhaustion.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter
WIPO Parallel Importation].
43
See The TRIPs Agreement and Pharmaceuticals: Parallel Import, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh1459e/6.4.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
44
See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 248–49 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
39
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purchase goods on the parallel market, it is disconcerting to the
patent owner because the patent owner would lose profits that it
could have earned had it been the seller. But this type of
importation is based on the doctrine of patent exhaustion, wherein
the rights afforded by a patent on a batch of products are exhausted
once a party has initially sold that batch.45 Thus, under the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, the patent owner has no rights in a
product once the product has been sold to the first party, regardless
of whether or not the first party resells the good.46 An LDC cannot
afford to pay retail, so parallel importation is one method by which
it can gain access to life-saving treatments at much lower prices.
Despite the two available options aimed at improving public
health access for LDCs—compulsory licenses and parallel
importation—there was little movement on the part of the
developing countries to use them.47 Complaints arose that
developed countries were acting contrary to the furtherance of
public health by setting forth intellectual property requirements,
such as the recognition and enforcement of patent protection for
epidemic-treating pharmaceuticals, that could not be met by
LDCs.48
Another problem with TRIPS that became apparent was that a
compulsory license would only be beneficial if the licensee
country had the infrastructure and capability to make use of the
formula or technology because a license only gives authority to use
the formula in the patent.49 Thus, a country that lacks the facilities
to manufacture the formula or technology will be unable to make
use of the compulsory license. Certain developing countries such
as Brazil do have manufacturing capabilities, but many LDCs such
as those in Sub-Saharan Africa do not. Therefore, a compulsory
license, as allowed under article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement,
would be of little or no use to those countries. The Doha
45

WIPO Parallel Importation, supra note 42; see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115–17 (2008).
46
See id.
47
See Jerome H. Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of Patented
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 248
(2009).
48
See id.
49
Id.
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Declaration was adopted, in part, to deal with this issue and to
highlight the importance of the implementation and interpretation
of the TRIPS Agreement provisions aimed at public health.50
B. The Doha Declaration
The fourth Ministerial Declaration51 was adopted at the Fourth
Session of the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference
in Doha, Qatar in November of 2001, and it includes the public
health-specific Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (the “Doha Declaration”).52 This declaration was meant to
stress the importance of using TRIPS to further public health by
“promoting both access to existing medicines and research and
development into new medicines.”53 It sought to accomplish this
by clarifying the options available to member countries.54
The Public Health Declaration states that “each member has
the right to grant compulsory licen[s]es and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licen[s]es are granted.”55
It allows for each member to determine, for the purposes of issuing
a compulsory license, “what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency.”56 It specifically referred
to emergencies relating to HIV/AIDS and other epidemic
diseases.57
But under the language of the TRIPS Agreement, a compulsory
license could only be granted for use in the domestic market of the
requestor.58 This has two important implications: one, a country
lacking sufficient manufacturing capacity cannot make use of it,
and two, a country that was issued a compulsory license could only
50

Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
52
Doha Declaration, supra note 19.
53
Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51, ¶ 17.
54
See Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 5.
55
Id. ¶ 5(b).
56
Id. ¶ 5(c).
57
“Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id.
58
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31(f).
51
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produce the licensed technology for its domestic use and could not
export the product to other countries that lacked manufacturing
capabilities.59 Doha “recognize[d] that WTO members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”60 Although
the Public Health Declaration did not resolve the issue, it called on
the Council for TRIPS to address the problem and find a solution
by the end of 2002.61
The Public Health Declaration also touches upon parallel
importation by interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to allow for each
member to establish how it would proscribe the activity.62 Again,
parallel importation allows for an LDC to buy the good for a lower
price than if it obtained the good straight from the patent owner.63
An example would be Brazil obtaining a license from an American
company to manufacture and sell an HIV/AIDS drug domestically,
and then selling the product to Africa without permission from the
American company.
Taking into account the difficulties of establishing a system by
which 1) intellectual property rights will be protected, and 2)
violations of those rights will be enforced in an LDC, the Public
Health Declaration also stresses that TRIPS give LDC members
until January 1, 2016 to comply with certain sections of the TRIPS
Agreement.64 This deadline is an exception to the one-year
deadline for developed countries and the 2005 deadline for
developing member countries.65 The Public Health Declaration
also recognizes the “right of least developed country members to

59

See id. at art. 31(e).
Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6.
61
Id.
62
See id. ¶ 5(d).
63
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
64
Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 7 (“We also agree that the least developed
country members will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to
implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce
rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the
right of least developed country members to seek other extensions of the transition
periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.”).
65
TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 65.
60
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seek other extensions of the transition periods.”66 The Declaration
specifically states that this exception applies “with respect to
pharmaceutical products.”67
Since the intellectual property
regimes of LDCs are not as developed, it is likely that they will
seek additional extensions in order to implement the TRIPS
Agreement’s requirements. But extending the deadline for
compliance without further specifying how to comply or assisting
with compliance will not help member countries become
compliant, especially if they can keep seeking extensions of the
transition periods.68
C. August 30, 2003, TRIPS Council Decision
In addition to the further clarification and direction provided by
Doha, issues that arise from the administration of the TRIPS
Agreement are addressed through decisions delivered by the
Council for TRIPS.69 The most important decision related to
public health is the August 30, 2003 Decision (the “2003
Decision”).70 This decision purported to solve the issue of
compulsory licensing in the case of member countries lacking
production capabilities.71
The 2003 Decision specifically took into account the
instruction of the Doha Declaration to find a solution to the
problem of the difficulties that “WTO members with insufficient
or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could
face in making effective use of compulsory licenses.”72 A
compulsory license, with nothing more, does not provide much
help to a country that does not have the manufacturing ability to
make use of the license. As such, the 2003 Decision sets forth the

66

Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 7.
Id.
68
See TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 66(1).
69
TRIPS Council, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
E/trips_e/intel6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The Council for TRIPS is the body
responsible for administering TRIPS. Id.
70
Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 Decision].
71
Id.
72
Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6.
67

C06_MELLINO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1362

10/24/2010 12:56 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1349

framework for a system (otherwise known as the Paragraph 6
System) in which the affected LDC can obtain needed
pharmaceutical products through a compulsory license that allows
for importation from another member country with sufficient
manufacturing capabilities.73 “Within that framework, each WTO
member decides for itself how it will implement the decision
domestically” through its legislation.74
LDCs are identified as “eligible importing [m]ember[s]” under
the decision,75 and other member countries can be eligible to
become importing members as long as they meet certain
guidelines.76 An eligible importing member may use the system
“in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or . . . [for] public non-commercial use.”77 This
is consistent with the compulsory license language in both TRIPS
and the Doha Declaration.78
The 2003 Decision also sets out requirements that must be met
in order for countries to participate in the Paragraph 6 System.79
Requirements for importing countries, such as LDCs, to import
pharmaceutical products include, but are not limited to,
specification of “the names and expected quantities of the product
needed” to the Council for TRIPS, and granting a compulsory
license if that pharmaceutical product is patented in the LDC’s
territory.80

73

See 2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 6.
Features of the Regime, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, http://www.camrrcam.gc.ca/intro/regime_e.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
75
2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 1(b).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See supra notes 33–37, 55–57 and accompanying text.
79
See 2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 2(a).
80
Id. (according to paragraph 2(a) of the 2003 Decision, importing countries must: “(i)
specif[y] the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed; (ii) confirm[] that
the eligible importing [m]ember in question, other than a least developed country
[m]ember, has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the
Annex to this Decision; and (iii) confirm[] that, where a pharmaceutical product is
patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory license in
accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of this
Decision”).
74
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The exporting member countries also must meet certain
requirements.81 They can only manufacture the amount necessary
to meet the needs of the importing member, whose needs were
already specified to the Council for TRIPS,82 and the entire amount
of that production must then be exported to the requesting
importing member.83 The products must be specifically identified
as being produced under the system laid out in the 2003
Decision.84 Finally, prior to shipping, any exporting member must
post on a website the quantities being supplied to the destination
and the distinguishing features of the product.85
In addition, the exporting member countries must provide
adequate remuneration, “taking into account the economic value to
the importing [m]ember,” whereas this requirement is waived for
importing countries.86 As stated earlier, “adequate remuneration”
is not detailed in TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, or the 2003
Decision.87 In fact adequate remuneration varies widely from
country to country.88 In Remuneration Guidelines for NonVoluntary Use of a Patent on Medical Technologies, James Love
points out that countries should focus on two issues when setting
forth their own guidelines for remuneration, one of which is to
ensure that the royalty is not so high that it presents “a barrier for

81
Id. ¶ 2(b) (“[T]he compulsory licen[s]e issued by the exporting [m]ember under this
Decision shall contain the following conditions: (i) only the amount necessary to meet the
needs of the eligible importing [m]ember(s) may be manufactured under the licen[s]e and
the entirety of this production shall be exported to the [m]ember(s) which has notified its
needs to the Council for TRIPS; (ii) products produced under the licen[s]e shall be clearly
identified as being produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific
label[]ing or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through special
packaging and/or special colo[]ring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that
such distinction is feasible and does not have a significant impact on price; and (iii)
before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website [certain] information.”).
82
Id. ¶ 2(b)(i).
83
Id.
84
Id. ¶ 2(b)(ii).
85
Id. ¶ 2(b)(iii).
86
Id. ¶ 3.
87
See generally TRIPS, supra note 12; Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51; Doha
Declaration, supra note 19; 2003 Decision, supra note 70.
88
LOVE, supra note 41, at 5.
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access to medicines.”89 This is especially true when a compulsory
license is issued for the very purpose of improved access to
medicines at lower prices.90 Typically, in a situation where a
compulsory license is issued for public health reasons in lowincome countries, the remuneration has been between 0 and 6% of
the generic price.91
Though compulsory license remuneration in public health
situations is typically low, the TRIPS provision nonetheless allows
for substantial discretion.92 It is likely that TRIPS left this
provision somewhat arbitrary in order to pacify all member
countries, especially developed member countries in which patent
protection is significantly more important in helping patent holders
obtain profits. In fact, patent holders that do not agree with the
level of remuneration that the country offers can bring a complaint
before the TRIPS Council.93 So, although guidelines have been
published, it is unlikely that a consensus will be reached on the
prevailing standard for adequate remuneration any time soon.
The 2003 Decision also opened another avenue to bring much
needed pharmaceutical products to developing or least developed
countries—an importing member that has produced or imported a
pharmaceutical product may export the product to another
developed or developing country that is a party to the same
regional trade agreement and shares the same health problem.94 It
states that “[i]t is understood that this will not prejudice the
territorial nature of the patent rights in question.”95 In effect, the
2003 Decision is condoning parallel importation to the extent that
similarly suffering developing or least developed countries can

89

Id. (noting two paramount issues: 1) “the system of setting royalties should not be
overly complex or difficult to administer, given the capacity of the government managing
the system,” and 2) “the amount of the royalty should not present a barrier for access to
medicines”).
90
Id.
91
See id. at 7–9.
92
Id. at 5.
93
See Gustav Ando, World’s First Compulsory License Issued in Malaysia for Generic
HIV/AIDS Drug, WORLD MARKET ANALYSIS, Feb. 24, 2004.
94
2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 6(i).
95
Id. ¶ 6(i).
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export pharmaceutical products to each other if they are in need of
treatment for the same health problems.
After the 2003 Decision, many countries announced that they
would not use the Paragraph 6 System to import, even if they meet
the specific requirements and guidelines.96
These member
countries consist mainly of the United States, Canada, European
countries, Australia, and New Zealand.97 Another group of
member countries specified that it would only use the system to
import in national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.98 This group includes member countries such as China,
Israel, Mexico, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates.99
The provisions of the 2003 Decision were formally accepted as
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement on December 6, 2005, and
will be formally built into TRIPS when two-thirds of the WTO’s
members have ratified the change.100 But, despite the fact that this
option is now on the table, it has seen very little use. Even as
recently as December of 2008, the Director-General of the WTO,
Pascal Lamy, admitted that criticism of the cumbersome and
complex nature of the system has possibly stymied any or most
positive effects.101 A more detailed analysis will be provided in
Parts III and IV.
II. APPLICATION OF TRIPS, DOHA, AND THE DECISIONS
While much focus has been placed on ensuring that a
framework exists for the furtherance of public health, as mentioned
above, member countries have been slow to implement the
procedures laid out in TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, and the
Various reasons, such as the
decisions that followed.102
96

WTO Obligations, supra note 17.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Decision of General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec.
6, 2005); see also Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make
Health Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm.
101
Lamy, supra note 22.
102
See infra Part III.
97
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complexity of a country’s legislation relating to the provisions, fear
of trade retaliation, interference with basic intellectual property
rights, and lack of technology suited for LDCs, continue to stymie
the progress on providing access to essential pharmaceuticals.103
While placing measures to further public health in written
agreements is certainly one step towards that goal, countries must
move beyond mere verbal and written support and actually begin
to implement these principles. Additionally, many of the most
visible global organizations are also dedicated to finding solutions
for these public health problems,104 but again, they have produced
very little more than verbal and written support. The following are
examples of how the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement are being
treated or applied throughout the world.
A. World Organizations
The United Nations (the “U.N.”) is a prominent global
organization “committed to maintaining international peace and
security, developing friendly relations among nations and
promoting social progress, better living standards and human
rights.”105 In fact, the U.N. established UNAIDS106—a program
specifically dedicated to the “global commitment to scale up
access to HIV treatment, prevention, care and support.”107 In a
2006 declaration, twelve years after TRIPS was signed and five
years after Doha, the U.N. went so far as to “[r]eaffirm that the
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures now and in the future to protect
public health.”108 Members also “[r]esolve[d] to assist developing

103

See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Health, The International Response, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/
health/index_response.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010); see also infra Part II.A.
105
UN at a Glance, UN, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 5,
2010).
106
UNAIDS, http://unaids.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
107
Universal Access to HIV Treatment, Prevention, Care and Support, UNAIDS,
http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/UniversalAccess/default.asp (last visited
Apr. 5, 2010).
108
G.A. Res 60/262, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/262 (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter G.A.
Res 60/262].
104
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countries”109 and “[e]ncourage pharmaceutical companies, donors,
multilateral organizations and other partners to develop publicprivate partnerships in support of research and development and
technology transfer.”110
These statements are encouraging and show that the
organization supports the public health initiatives of TRIPS. But
merely setting forth reaffirmations and resolutions in a declaration
will not ensure implementation of the public health initiatives by
participating countries. These countries actually have to act on the
points in these declarations through modification of certain
legislation and regional and bilateral treaty agreements. Mention
was also made to private-public partnerships,111 the viability of
which will be developed further in Part IV.
The World Health Organization (the “WHO”) is another
prominent global organization addressing public health
problems.112 Its responsibilities include “providing leadership on
global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting
norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options,
providing technical support to countries and monitoring and
assessing health trends.”113 It has also called for measures to
increase the access to life-saving pharmaceuticals, such as
removing intellectual property barriers to research and
development for public health.114 WHO member countries
participated in drafting a resolution outlining steps needed to
improve public health, though barely referring to the provisions in
TRIPS.115 But again, these steps are essentially broad measures
only touching upon the surface. To give life to these resolutions,
countries will have to ensure that the legislation and treaty
agreements allow for such measures.
109

Id. ¶ 44.
Id. ¶ 46.
111
See infra Part IV.B.2.
112
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/en (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
113
About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/en (last visited Apr.
5, 2010).
114
See World Health Assembly Resolution on Global Strategy and Plan of Action on
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA. Res. 61.21, ¶ 2, 61st World
Health Assembly, 8th plen. mtg. WHO Doc. WHA61/2008/Rec.21 (May 24, 2008).
115
See generally id. at annex.
110
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The real problem in implementing TRIPS-like provisions is
that the TRIPS Agreement’s main purpose is to afford a system of
uniform protection measures for intellectual property rights of all
member countries.116 By signing TRIPS, developed countries
looked to secure in other member countries the same or a similar
level of rights that they afford their domestic intellectual property
owners.117 Promoting public health measures was only a side
issue, and therefore exceptions were carved out of TRIPS to
facilitate this secondary purpose.118 In fact, the system set forth in
the 2003 Decision is contrary to the main purpose of facilitating
protection of intellectual property rights cross-border.119 This
issue will be analyzed further in Part III.
B. Member Country Reactions
A prime example of the juxtaposition between developed
countries’ push for greater intellectual property protection across
borders, and the detrimental effect that increased protection has on
the LDCs’ ability to obtain pharmaceuticals at affordable prices, is
the lawsuit brought by thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies,
including the United States and European companies, to block
legislation passed by the South African government in 1997.120
The legislation aimed to allow for the parallel importation of
drugs, generic replacement of brand-named drugs, and price
controls.121 The pharmaceutical companies argued that the
legislation was counter to South Africa’s commitment to TRIPS,
specifically, to promote recognition and protection of the
companies’ patents. South Africa, on the other hand, argued that
its actions were in line with TRIPS.122

116

See TRIPS, supra note 12, at pmbl.
See WTO Overview, supra note 21.
118
See id.
119
See infra Part III.
120
Int’l Activity Report, South Africa: Big Pharma Backs Down, DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS (2001), http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=1204
[hereinafter Big Pharma Backs Down]; see also Anthony Stoppard, Health—South
Africa: Drug Companies Drop Lawsuit Against Government, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Apr.
19, 2001), http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010413.html.
121
Big Pharma Backs Down, supra note 120.
122
Id.
117
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During this time, the United States also placed South Africa on
its Special 301 Report.123 As will be discussed in Part III, the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (the “USTR”)
created the Special 301 Report to list and give notice to countries
that it believes to have committed trade violations.124 Once they
have been put on notice by the Special 301 Report, countries are
subject to trade sanctions if actually found to be in violation of
trade agreements.125
But shortly after initiating the lawsuit, the pharmaceutical
companies were met with much resistance from, amongst others,
non-governmental organizations like Medecins Sans Frontiers.126
Finally, in 2001, around the time when the Doha Declaration was
highlighting the importance of facilitating access to pharmaceutical
drugs for LDCs, the pharmaceutical companies dropped the
lawsuit.127
Despite the aforementioned treatment of South Africa,
countries such as the United States are currently expressing their
support of public health initiatives taken by LDCs. But it is still
questionable whether or not the support will move beyond mere
express support to actionable support In the April 2009 Special
301 Report, the USTR acknowledged its support of public health
measures, although using a supportive rather than a proactive
tone.128 For instance, the United States “respects a country’s right
to protect public health, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all and supports the vital role of the patent system in
promoting the development and creation of new and innovative
lifesaving drugs.”129 The United States also “respects” rights to
grant compulsory licenses and notes the country’s acceptance of
the 2005 Amendment, adopted by the TRIPS General Council,
123
Scott Lucyk, Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential Medicines
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 38 OTTAWA L. REV. 191, 213 (2006).
124
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2009)
[hereinafter 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPORT.pdf.
125
See id. at 39.
126
See Big Pharma Backs Down, supra note 120.
127
Stoppard, supra note 120.
128
See 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 124, at 6.
129
Id.
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promoting public health.130 Additionally, the USTR stated in its
Special Report that “[t]he United States will work to ensure that
the provision of our bilateral and regional trade agreements are
consistent with these views, and do not impede the taking of
measures necessary to protect public health.”131
In order to give credence to the TRIPS provisions on public
health and its statement above, the United States needs to be
proactive and set forth provisions in its trade agreements and
legislation that foster “access to medicine” for all. Mere verbal
and written support in a report is not enough. In fact, critics are
quick to point out that the United States has no problem issuing
compulsory licenses for its own gain,132 yet discourages others
from using them, especially in public health circumstances (as seen
in the case of South Africa).133 Other countries that signed on to
TRIPS must also move past mere support and become active in
implementing health measures. To date, only one country has
taken the initiative to export pharmaceutical products through the
Paragraph 6 System—Canada.134
C. Utilization of Compulsory Licenses
Prior to 2005, developing countries and LDCs could more
easily obtain generic HIV/AIDS drugs from India through
compulsory licenses that did not fall under the reach of TRIPS
because India did not recognize patents on medicines and had
expansive manufacturing capabilities.135 But in 2005, India
implemented intellectual property protection for patents on
medicines to comply with TRIPS; thus the use of such compulsory
licenses dropped considerably.136 Because countries could no
130

Id.
Id.
132
The United States issued a compulsory license for the antibiotic Ciprofloxacin, from
Bayer, during the Anthrax scare in 2001. See LOVE, supra note 41, at 28.
133
Dutfield, supra note 1, at 112.
134
Kanaga Raja, Members Discussed Implementation of TRIPS “Para 6” Solution,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/
2010/twninfo100212.htm.
135
See Sangeeta Shashikant, More Countries Use Compulsory License, But New
Problems Emerge, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (May 19, 2005), http://www.twnside.org.sg/
title2/health.info/twninfohealth004.htm.
136
See id.
131
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longer use compulsory licenses to obtain generic versions of
patented pharmaceuticals from India, they were forced to follow
the provisions for obtaining a compulsory license highlighted in
the Doha Declaration.
Initially, countries were slow to implement any of these
provisions, but developing countries with manufacturing
capabilities started to take advantage of them around 2006.137 In
2006, Thailand issued a compulsory license for Efavirenz, an HIV
drug manufactured by Merck & Co.,138 and in January of 2007,
Thailand also issued a compulsory license on the antiretroviral
HIV/AIDS drug, Kaletra, made by Abbott Laboratories.139 Then,
in May of 2007, Brazil followed suit by issuing a compulsory
license for Efavirenz after price negotiations broke down between
the country and Merck.140 On a similar note, the Philippines
introduced legislation that made it easier to issue compulsory
licenses and allow for parallel importation.141 Again, compulsory
licenses allow countries to provide needed treatment at a much
lower cost than if they would have had to purchase directly from
the patent owner.142
Although these countries are not as
financially destitute as an LDC, they still do not possess the
resources of a developed nation.
While this relatively recent uptick in compulsory license
activity is positive for countries with manufacturing capabilities,
there are negatives, as discussed later in Part III. The licenses are
also useless for a country with no manufacturing capacities
because a compulsory license, on its own, only requires that the
patent owner allow the requesting party to make use of the formula
or technology encompassed in the patent.143 Most LDCs would
137

Gail E. Evans, Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research Organizations:
Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical R&D in Developing
Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 181–83 (2008).
138
Examples of Health-Related Compulsory Licenses, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH.,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
139
Evans, supra note 137, at 184 (noting that U.S.-based Abbott Laboratories owned
the patent on the antiretroviral drug licensed by Thailand).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 120.
143
Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6.
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need to utilize the Paragraph 6 system to obtain the needed
medicines because they do not have manufacturing capabilities
within their own countries. But, to date, Rwanda is the only
country without sufficient manufacturing capabilities to make
sufficient use of a compulsory license and take advantage of the
Paragraph 6 system.144
D. Utilization of the Paragraph 6 System
In 2004, Canada implemented a version of the Paragraph 6
System by modifying its drug patent legislation with An Act to
Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act—The Jean
Chrétien Pledge to Africa (the “Jean Chrétien Act”).145 The Jean
Chrétien Act set up the legal framework for what is known as
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (“CAMR”).146 CAMR lays
out the requirements that must be met for a country, such as an
LDC, to import disease-treating drugs.147 It also lays out the
requirements for companies willing to take part in the manufacture
and export of the drugs to requesting countries.148 The goal of the
CAMR is “to facilitate timely access to generic versions of
patented drugs and medical devices, especially those needed by
least developed or developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS,
malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases.”149 In September of 2007,

144

See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Rwanda Pioneers Use of WTO Patent Flexibility for
HIV/AIDS Medicine, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 20, 2007), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2007/07/20/rwanda-pioneers-use-of-wto-patent-flexibility-for-hivaidsmedicine (noting that Rwanda was the first and only country to import patented medicine
produced without authorization from patent holders because it was a country “with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
145
Background, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, http://www.camrrcam.
gc.ca/intro/context_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Background, CAMR].
146
Id.
147
Requirements for Importing Countries, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME,
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/countr-pays/import/index_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010)
[hereinafter Requirements for Importing Countries, CAMR].
148
Requirements for Companies, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, http://www.camrrcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/req-exig/index_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010)
[hereinafter Requirements for Companies, CAMR].
149
Background, CAMR, supra note 145.
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Canada utilized its version of the system to ship generic HIV/AIDS
medicines to Rwanda.150
The requirements of an importing country under CAMR are to
identify a drug from the list of eligible products, notify the WTO
of its need, and then find a suitable pharmaceutical company from
which it can import the drug.151 The exporting party, the
pharmaceutical company, is first required to enter into a sales
agreement with the importing country for a specified quantity of a
specific drug.152 The company is also required to submit an
application to Canada’s Commissioner of Patents to obtain an
authorization for export.153 Additional terms and conditions after
authorization must be met, including certain anti-diversionary
measures.154 The products to be exported must meet the same
safety, efficacy, and quality requirements that drugs for national
use are required to meet.155 In addition, the product manufactured
for export must have special markings, coloring, and labeling that
will distinguish it from the patented version that is sold on the
national level.156
In 2008, upon the authorization of GlaxoSmithKline and the
Canadian subsidiaries of Shire and Boehringer Ingelheim, general
drug maker Apotex manufactured a “fixed dose triple combination
antiretroviral medicine” for export to Rwanda.157 Apotex has since
sent out two total shipments of the AIDS drug to Rwanda.158
Despite these successful shipments, no other developing country
has tried to import drugs from Canada.159 Even Rwanda would
150

Nikki Bozinoff, A Pharm Reduction Approach, DOMINION (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3288.
151
Requirements for Importing Countries, CAMR, supra note 147.
152
Requirements for Companies, CAMR, supra note 148.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Anti-Diversionary Measures—Companies, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME,
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/req-exig/anti_e.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2010).
157
Big Pharmaceutical Firms Agree to Generic Drugs for Rwanda, AFRICA GOOD
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.africagoodnews.com/health/big-pharmaceutical-firmsagree-to-generic-drugs-for-rwanda.html [hereinafter Generic Drugs for Rwanda].
158
Id. One shipment of the generic drug amounts to a one-year supply. Id.
159
See Raja, supra note 134.
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have to restart the CAMR process if it wanted to reorder the same
drug because of the provision in CAMR that limits the quantity of
the license to the amount originally requested by the country.160
III. ISSUES AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRIPS
PROVISIONS
A. Complexity of Legislation
As alluded to in the section above, the Paragraph 6 System has
been implemented only once with little or no indication of when it
will be implemented again.161 The generic manufacturer Apotex
and other critics have pointed out several issues with CAMR that
may account for the failure of additional implementation.
Apotex indicated that CAMR is too complicated a process and
that other countries wishing to import drugs have not yet made any
effort to “jump through the hoops imposed by CAMR.”162 In its
criticism, it cites to such problems as the difficulty that LDCs have
in identifying the proper process to obtain import permission.163
Other critics have also found the legislation to be “overly complex
and unusable.”164 They cite to the lack of input in the legislative
process from the governments of the developing countries as one
of the root problems.165 For instance, there are over nineteen
sections and one hundred sub-clauses in the legislation to read

160
Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler, Laura C. Esmail & Andrea Perez Cosio, Canada’s
Implementation of the Paragraph 6 Decision: Is It Sustainable Public Policy?,
GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.global
izationandhealth.com/content/pdf/1744-8603-3-12.pdf; see also Requirements for
Importing Countries, CAMR, supra note 147.
161
See Raja, supra note 134.
162
Press Release, Apotex Inc., Second Shipment of Life-Saving Aids Drug Leaving for
Africa (Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/
20090918.asp.
163
Letter from John Hems, Dir., Can.’s Access to Meds. Regime, to Douglas Clark &
Brigitte Zirger, Dirs., Apotex Inc. (Jan. 23, 2007) [hereinafter CAMR Letter], available
at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/review-reviser/camr_rcam_apotex_18-eng.pdf.
164
Cohen-Kohler, Esmail & Cosio, supra note 160.
165
Id.
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through and interpret.166 This requires some level of legal training
or support to analyze and implement.167 As such, significant
resources must be spent on this analysis, but unfortunately,
resources are limited in LDCs.168 The legislation also restricts the
list of medicines available—if a drug is not on the list, it cannot be
manufactured for export.169 This is a problem because LDCs are in
need of many drugs that are not on the list.170 These examples of
the complicated nature of the importation system are by no means
exhaustive, as other criticisms have been launched.
Other problems cited by Apotex affect the manufacturer.171
Requirements such as trying to obtain a voluntary license prior to a
compulsory license, or having to renew a compulsory license, are
unnecessary, time consuming, and add to the cost of the process.172
Unlike TRIPS, CAMR still requires a negotiation period with the
patent owner before a country may apply for a compulsory
license.173 The costs of the negotiations alone act as a deterrent to
generic manufactures.174 In fact, Apotex itself threatened to
abandon the project, citing that the process was too “costly and
complicated.”175 On a positive note, the three drug companies
initially authorizing Apotex to manufacture the “triple
combination” medicine have just recently pledged their continued

166

MARILYN MCHARG, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES CAN., REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN
ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME: SUBMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (2007),
available at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/review-reviser/camr_rcam_msf_11-eng.pdf.
167
See id.; see also Cohen-Kohler, Esmail & Cosio, supra note 160 (“Administratively,
the CAMR assumes that developing country governments have the requisite knowledge
and human resource capacity to make use of the regime.”).
168
MCHARG, supra note 166.
169
Id.
170
See id.
171
See CAMR Letter, supra note 163.
172
Id.
173
Preparing to Submit an Application, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME,
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/applic-demande/prepar_e.html
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2010) (“At least 30 days before submitting the application, the company
must try to obtain from the patent holder a voluntary licen[s]e to make and export the
patented product.”).
174
Paige E. Goodwin, Note, Right Idea, Wrong Result—Canada’s Access to Medicines
Regime, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 578 (2008).
175
Generic Drugs for Rwanda, supra note 157.
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support of the distribution of the less expensive version of their
medicine.176
The Apotex example highlights the complexities in the process
for exporting drugs to developing countries and LDCs. Even in a
country that has the legislation in place to facilitate the
export/import process, the generic manufacturer threatened to back
out and no additional countries have requested aid. Therefore,
CAMR should be used as a case study for countries thinking of
implementing TRIPS provisions within their legislation. The
Council for TRIPS should also study this drug product exchange
and examine whether changes can and should be made to the
Paragraph 6 system. This issue will be analyzed further in Part IV.
B. Fear of Retaliation
On top of the legislative aspects preventing widespread
implementation of the Paragraph 6 system, LDCs may be hesitant
to seek products from an exporting country for fear of trade
retaliation.177 The same fear is present when a developing or least
developed country issues a compulsory license or partakes in
parallel importation. Trade retaliation occurs when a first country
such as the United States places sanctions on a second country for
partaking in a trade-related activity that negatively affects a certain
market in the first country.178
For instance, when Thailand issued its compulsory license in
2007, the United States responded by placing Thailand on the
Special 301 Report.179 As briefly discussed in Part II, the United
States’ Special 301 Report was born out of section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974.180 Relating to intellectual property, section 301
allows the United States to take action in the form of trade
sanctions against those countries that do not provide adequate

176

Id.
Dutfield, supra note 1, at 123.
178
Feroz Ali. K, Intellectual Property Rights—US, Trade Sanctions and IPRs, HINDU
BUS. LINE (June 15, 2004), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/06/15/stories/
2004061500111100.htm.
179
See Evans, supra note 137, at 184.
180
See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 212; Ali. K, supra note 178.
177
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intellectual property protection.181 The United States places these
countries on a watch list, otherwise known as the Special 301
Report.182
In yet another example of retaliation, as previously discussed in
Part II, the Clinton administration put South Africa on the section
301 watch list after it attempted to pass similar legislation.183 As
such, the legislation was never implemented in South Africa, even
though the lawsuit brought by the pharmaceutical companies was
dropped.184 Because placement on such lists can lead to trade
sanctions, these countries are always mindful of the effects that
certain actions can have on foreign direct investments.185 Thus,
unless TRIPS is amended to include a deterrent mechanism to
prevent countries from partaking in trade retaliation after a
compulsory license is issued, this hesitancy may remain.
C. Interference with Intellectual Property Rights of Patent
Holders
While compulsory licenses, parallel importation, and the
Paragraph 6 System are allowed by TRIPS and do provide for a
way in which LDCs can obtain products at substantially less than
retail price,186 they are not methods which should be sustained in
the long run due to their interference with intellectual property
rights.
In the case of a compulsory license without export capabilities,
the patent owner is forced to license its formula or technology for
little remuneration at best, especially when dealing with LDCs.187
When a patent owner is forced to license his formula or technology
for little pecuniary gain, he is giving up one of the benefits of

181

See Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006); see also Ali. K, supra note

178.
182

See Ali. K, supra note 178.
Lucyk, supra note 123, at 213.
184
Id.
185
Evans, supra note 137, at 184.
186
See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 121–22.
187
See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 209–10 (describing that royalties under a compulsory
license tend to be lower than the profits lost by the licensor, particularly where the
compulsory license is specifically implemented to lower prices).
183
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obtaining a patent.188 As stated previously, one of the purposes of
implementing the patent system is to encourage innovation by
giving the inventor a monopoly over that specific technology so
that he can recoup the costs he incurred in developing the
invention.189
On the other side of the argument, under TRIPS, this license is
only given in very limited circumstances—such as a country’s dire
need for treatment of epidemic diseases.190 Thus, in the markets
where companies make most of their profits, the patent monopoly
will still be recognized. Additionally, the patent owner will not
have to devote any of its production or capital to the manufacture
of drugs because it is only licensing the technology in the patent.
Regardless, this method of promoting public health still goes
against the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and erodes the
benefits of a patent owner’s temporary monopoly.191
Parallel importation also encroaches on the benefits that a
patent owner hopes to receive from its patent. When a country
obtains a patented product through a channel other than the patent
owner, it is eroding the monopoly to which the patent owner may
be entitled. This can happen when a country with a valid license
from the patent owner has an intellectual property regime in place
that allows for parallel importation.192 Although countries differ in
their treatment of parallel importation, the main purpose of TRIPS
is to promote increased protection of intellectual property rights.193
Thus, allowing a country to buy patented products from a party
other than the patent owner contravenes this purpose.

188

See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 7, at 284.
See id. at 283–84.
190
See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 193.
191
See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 7, at 283.
192
See KEITH E. MASKUS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PARALLEL IMPORTS IN
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1, 2 (2001); see also Goodwin, supra note 174, at 572 (noting that such a risk
is evident in implementation of these provisions, such that the 2003 Decision requires the
importing country to “take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their
administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the
products that have actually been imported into their territories under the system” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
193
See Goodwin, supra note 174, at 570.
189
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With the Paragraph 6 system, the patent owner also loses
possible revenue and experiences erosion of its monopoly.194 In
addition, generic companies must devote production capacities and
capital. The profits of a generic company are eroded because
resources are used to manufacture drugs for export through the
Paragraph 6 System that could be used to generate a profit. But
one beneficial effect would be the positive press that the
companies receive from these public health efforts.
D. Technology Not Suited for LDCs
Another categorical reason why the public health provisions in
TRIPS are not currently suited to provide a long-term solution to
the problem of lack of access to essential pharmaceuticals is that
the technology and treatments available through these provisions
are not necessarily directed towards the needs of those in
developing and least developed countries.195 A patent provides
innovation incentive to pharmaceutical companies to produce
drugs that will give them a healthy return on their investment.196
Unfortunately, treatment of tropical diseases or forms of diseases
occurring mostly in LDCs provide little or no innovation for a
pharmaceutical company to spend resources due to the low return
on investment they would receive.197 This is because these
diseases are prevalent in poor countries, yet virtually non-existent
in the developed countries where citizens can afford to pay the
retail prices that pharmaceutical companies charge to recoup their
investment.
194

See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 200.
See A Guide to the Post-2005 World: TRIPS, R&D and Access to Medicines,
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.msf.org/msfinter
national/invoke.cfm?objectid=88694E5B-0FED-434A-A21EDA1006002653&
component=toolkit.article&method=full_html&CFID=14506321&CFTOKEN=5743106
3; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim, Think Globally, Prescribe Locally: How Rational
Pharmaceutical Policy in the U.S. Can Improve Global Access to Essential Medicines, 34
AM. J.L. & MED. 125, 125 (2008).
196
See A Guide to the Post-2005 World, supra note 195.
197
LDCs are not a profitable market due to low buying power that their people and
governments possess. See id. Drug companies cannot turn a profit by marketing and
selling a drug solely in LDCs. See id.; see also Dutfield, supra note 1, at 112–13
(pointing out that the poor are disproportionately affected by diseases and receive little
resources compared to people affected by diseases prevalent in a developed country).
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Thus, while TRIPS may be able to help in situations of national
emergency or public health crises where a patent for the disease
actually exists, its public health provisions are not the optimal
solution for the future. Long-term feasibility is questionable, at
best, because TRIPS fails to alleviate the “constant tension
between patent holder and consumer” and attempts to “mediate [it]
through a complex body of rules.”198
E. Purpose of TRIPS Is Not for Promotion of Public Health
The main purpose of TRIPS is not to help curb the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in LDCs. Rather, its purpose is to ensure that holders of
intellectual property rights in one member country receive
reciprocal protection in another member country.
This is
accomplished by setting up a framework in which countries can
implement legislation and negotiate bilateral and multilateral
treaties.199 It has been asserted that TRIPS owes its existence to
the United States and developed European countries as a means of
securing an “advantage in knowledge-based industries.”200 These
countries knew that they were no longer the manufacturing
powerhouses that they once were and that their advantage would
now have to depend on the knowledge that they produced.201
Thus, they wanted a means by which their intellectual property
could be protected outside of their own countries and TRIPS was
their vehicle of choice.
Public health was not on their agendas and it did not really
come into focus until after TRIPS had been established—when
prices for life-saving treatments remained high.202 Because
developed countries want greater intellectual property protection
outside of their borders for their inventions and because LDCs
become subject to higher prices and subsequent lack of access if
they recognize these higher levels of protection, there is a constant
conflict between developed countries and LDCs.203
198
199
200
201
202
203

Evans, supra note 137, at 186.
See TRIPS, supra note 12, at pmbl.
Lucyk, supra note 123, at 212.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 213.

C06_MELLINO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

10/24/2010 12:56 PM

TRIPS AGREEMENT: HELPING OR HURTING LDCS?

1381

F. Lack of Sustainability
One of the problems with the Paragraph 6 System and parallel
importation is the lack of sustainability that results for LDCs such
as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. The public health measures
enumerated in the TRIPS Agreement allow countries to import
pharmaceutical products.204 But by continuously allowing for the
importation of these life-saving treatments, an LDC may never
learn how to sustain itself without relying on developed
countries.205 Additionally, while TRIPS calls for the observance of
intellectual property rights across all of its member countries,206 it
does not give guidance on how to develop a fully functional
intellectual property regime. LDCs will never be able to fully take
advantage of the agreement if they are not able to implement the
proper framework to recognize intellectual property rights. The
ultimate goal should be for these countries to have full
manufacturing and distribution capabilities as well as an
intellectual property regime capable of protection and enforcement
of such rights.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
A. TRIPS Options—Short Term
All three of the aforementioned public health measures in
TRIPS—compulsory licenses, the Paragraph 6 System, and
parallel importation207—can promote public health by offering
avenues in which developing and least developed countries could
obtain otherwise unaffordable treatment for epidemic diseases such
as HIV/AIDS. But, due to the limitations outlined in the previous
sections, TRIPS lacks viability as a long-term public health
solution and continues to stymie those efforts. Accordingly, these
measures should be seen as short-term solutions to the lack of
access problem that developing countries and LDCs are

204
205
206
207

See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 122.
See Evans, supra note 137, at 178.
Id. at 179–80.
See supra Part I.A; see also Dutfield, supra note 1, at 121–22.
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experiencing. As will be discussed later in Part IV.B, there are
other options that are more feasible as long-term solutions.
1. Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses alone or within the Paragraph 6 System
can deliver much needed assistance by providing LDCs with the
essential medicines that they need to treat epidemic diseases such
as HIV/AIDS in the short term. If an LDC has manufacturing
capabilities, access to a compulsory license alone would enable it
to manufacture drugs for those in need at a much lower cost.208
Also, the mere option of being able to assert a compulsory license
can strengthen the bargaining power of a country with
manufacturing capabilities to obtain a lower price from patent
holders of pharmaceuticals such as anti-AIDS drugs.209 But in
addition to the limitations stated in section A, compulsory licenses
outside the Paragraph 6 System cannot be used by countries
lacking manufacturing capability.
2. Paragraph 6 System
In order to provide essential medicines for those member
countries without manufacturing capabilities, member countries
with production capabilities can produce the drugs and export them
to the requesting importing member country.210 Again, even
though this Paragraph 6 system has barely been utilized up to this
point, there is now a model, CAMR,211 which other countries can
use as an example when revising their own legislation.
By analyzing Canada’s drug patent legislation and the CAMR
Rules, member countries to the TRIPS Agreement can find
provisions in the legislation that are necessary as well as provisions
that can be changed to ensure more use of the system. If changes
can be made to allow for a less complex system in which
producing parties can go about manufacturing and exporting in a
less costly and cumbersome way and importing parties are not
hampered by burdensome procedures for importing drugs, the
208
209
210
211

Lucyk, supra note 123, at 193.
Dutfield, supra note 1, at 120.
See Reichman, supra note 47, at 247–49.
See Goodwin, supra note 174, at 569.
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system may find more use. Some suggestions include removing
the negotiation requirement prior to applying for a compulsory
license, removing unnecessary clauses to make it easier for LDCs
to analyze the legislation, and expanding the number of drugs
available for export.212 The negotiation requirement is not present
in TRIPS and would only hinder a generic company’s ability or
desire to manufacture drugs for export. However, while this
system, if implemented properly, can provide the LDCs lacking
manufacturing capacity with the drugs necessary to treat epidemic
diseases in the short-term, it should not be a long-term solution.
3. Parallel Importation
Member countries can also make use of parallel importation to
bring in needed drugs that are produced in other countries. Even
though this system of parallel importation undermines the
intellectual property rights of the country that owns the rights to
the drug,213 it is one method by which a country can obtain
pharmaceutical products at a price cheaper than purchasing them
from the patent owner at their retail price.214
B. Long Term Options
1. Collaborative Groups
One model of providing public health assistance to LDCs that
has had early success is a group known as the International Drug
Purchase Facility, or UNITAID.215 UNITAID was founded in
2006 as a funding institution by a group of countries that “aim to
provide further drug access at affordable prices to developing
countries on a sustainable and predictable basis.”216 These
countries utilize long-term funding commitments, such as the
collection of taxes on airline flights, to purchase drugs or other

212

See MCHARG, supra note 166.
See MASKUS, supra note 192, at 2.
214
See id. at 121.
215
Mission, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/UNITAID-Mission.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010).
216
G.A. Res 60/262, supra note 108, ¶ 48.
213
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diagnostic tools at a high volume, which allows for a steep
reduction in cost.217
With TRIPS, the LDC requesting the drug treatment is not
fiscally equipped to purchase the drugs and does not receive
financial help from other parties, except the patent owner and/or
member country that is providing the technology or drugs. This
places a huge burden on the providing party because their only
form of compensation, if any, is “adequate remuneration.” Unlike
the provisions in TRIPS, UNITAID actually purchases the drugs,
albeit at a reduced cost from the original retail price, using funds
pooled from numerous countries.218 Thus, the patent owner
actually receives compensation. UNITAID, in a sense, has
managed to alleviate most of the tension between allowing a
patentee to obtain profits from its patented invention and providing
affordable access to low-income countries, whereas this tension
still remains in a compulsory license situation through TRIPS.
For example, UNITAID will often work in conjunction with
other organizations like UNICEF and the WHO.219 UNITAID will
provide the funding (through mechanisms such as the collection of
airline taxes) and its partner organizations are responsible for
procuring drugs at reduced prices.220 Just recently, UNITAID
obtained a 60% reduction in price for pediatric HIV/AIDS
medicines, which allowed for three times as many infected
children to be treated as would be treated at 100% of the price.221
So while 40% of retail price is a deep reduction in price, it is better
than a compensation percentage of less than 6%, which is typical
for remuneration in a compulsory license situation.222
The success of this group is just one indication that countries
are willing to take action to help alleviate the world’s public health
217
How Innovative Financing Works, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/Howinnovative-financing-works.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
218
See Questions and Answers, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/images/NewWeb/
documents/en_qa_finalrevised_mar10.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
219
Id.
220
See id.
221
See Statement on World AIDS Day, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/2008
1201165/News/UNITAID-statement-on-world-AIDS-day.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2010).
222
See LOVE, supra note 41, at 7–9.
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problems despite the lack of implementation of TRIPS provisions.
In just a few years of existence, UNITAID has grown to twentynine countries and has already been able to commit $730 million
towards its goal, and it is currently providing for those in need.223
In fact, over twenty countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are receiving
funds.224 Compare this with the one instance where the Paragraph
6 system was used—and only two countries were involved.
UNITAID is a means for countries to participate in alleviating
the world’s public health problems in which the constant tension
that remains with a compulsory license/export scenario—the
patentee’s right to obtain profits from its invention versus
affordable access for low-income countries—is greatly reduced.
As mentioned above, because the main purpose of TRIPS is to
foster shared intellectual property rights across country borders,
and not to provide access to life-saving treatments,225 this tension
will always exist when the provisions of TRIPS are used.
2. Private-Public Partnerships
Like TRIPS, however, UNITAID fails to provide a framework
through which the country to which it is providing aid can
eventually sustain itself. A 2006 U.N. Political Declaration alludes
to another option that may provide for sustainability and
furtherance of intellectual property rights in addition to access to
essential and affordable medicines on a long-term basis.226 In this
Declaration, the U.N. “[e]ncourage[s] pharmaceutical companies,
donors, multilateral organizations and other partners to develop
public-private partnerships in support of research and development
and technology transfer, and in the comprehensive response to
HIV/AIDS.”227

223

Achievements, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/Achievements.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010).
224
Countries Benefiting from HIV/AIDS Funding, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/
Countries-benefiting-from-HIV/AIDS-funding.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
225
See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries:
An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 457.
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A public-private partnership can help achieve the ultimate goal
of full manufacturing and distribution capabilities as well as a fully
functional intellectual property regime for LDCs. In this type of
partnership, private enterprises join forces with public sector
organizations or international organizations.228 The private party
or even the international organizations are the parties that shoulder
most of the financial and technological risk.229 For LDCs, this is
important because their governments and citizens cannot afford to
shoulder the burden on their own. The private enterprise will also
impart its expertise in areas like product development and
dissemination.230 An example of this partnership is the Kenya
Medical Research Institute (“KEMRI”).231 KEMRI is a state
owned corporation that partners with both local and outside
organizations such as the Wellcome Trust and the Centers for
Disease Control (the “CDC”), wherein these organizations impart
their expertise to KEMRI.232 KEMRI is now instrumental in
providing pharmaceutical research, development, and local
innovation in Kenya.233 It is also connected to the hospital systems
where it assists in the delivery of healthcare.234
While solutions such as public-private partnerships should be
preferred over the Paragraph 6 System and parallel importation,
compulsory licenses may be necessary for quite some time. This
necessity is due to the fact that manufacturing capacity and
technological know-how does not give a country the actual
technology that might be needed to provide sustained treatment.
More often than not, this technology will be patent-protected, and
without the funds to either purchase the drugs outright from the
patent owner or pay a reasonable fee for a license, a compulsory
license will be needed.235 But, over time, the hope is that with the
228
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See id. at 186–88.
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See id. at 187–88.
233
See id.
234
Id. at 188.
235
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help of partnerships and other methods, these countries will
generate innovative technology on their own.
CONCLUSION
The public health provisions in TRIPS (compulsory licenses,
the Paragraph 6 System, and parallel importation) have not been
very successful in alleviating the world’s public health problems.
Although some countries were able to provide low cost medicines
to their citizens through compulsory licenses,236 the few countries
making use of them have been subject to retaliation and
resistance.237 The Paragraph 6 System, although it provided
treatment for those in need in Rwanda,238 has only been used once
and has received much criticism. In addition, no other country has
taken advantage of it. Although countries and organizations
appear to support the provisions, the support has been limited to
passive written and verbal support.
While these provisions may be able to provide short-term and
emergency options, they are ineffective for long-term solutions to
public health problems. Tension will always remain between
member countries seeking profits through better intellectual
property protection and countries needing access to patented
medicines.
Because of this tension, developing and least
developed countries will remain cautious for fear of retaliation and
loss of foreign direct investment.239 In addition, requirements for
implementation of these provisions are somewhat cumbersome and
complex, making them difficult to implement.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to solve the
world’s public health problems, ventures such as private-public
partnerships can avoid the tension resulting from TRIPS and
provide long-term sustainability by imparting funds, and
technological, manufacturing, and distribution know-how. Privatepublic partnerships can also help implement an intellectual
property regime.
236
237
238
239

See Reichman, supra note 47, at 249–50.
See id. at 249.
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In essence, because of its focus on equal and rigorous
protection of intellectual property rights, TRIPS hurts LDCs’
access to essential pharmaceuticals despite the various public
health provisions built into the agreement. Thus, the TRIPS
Agreement should not be used as a long-term solution to the public
health problem of access to essential pharmaceuticals.

